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U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. President,
On January 20, the Under Secretary of State, the honorable
Elliot L. Richardson, examined U.S. relations with Western Europe,
in general, and the question o f U.S. force levels in Europe, in
particular, in an address bef ore the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations.

At the beginning o f his speech, Mr. Richardson referred

to the resolution I submitted to the Senate on December 1, S. Res.
292, which cal l s f or "a substantial reduction o f U.S. f orces
.
d ln
.
Europe . • . II
permanent 1 y statlone

In introducing that resolution on December 1, I made a
statement on t h e Floor o f the Senate setting forth the reasons
t h at I thought justif ied a downward adjustment of the level o f
our f orces in Europe.

I pointed to t h e enormous costs involved

-2in maintaining a military establishment of 3.5 million men under
arms with 1.2 million men outside the United States and over
300,000 of these -- together with 235,000 dependents and 14,000
in Western Europe.

U.S. civilian employees

I pointed to the

fact that our net foreign exchange gap with Germany is running
at about $965 million a year, and I should note parenthetically
that Mr. Richardson reminded his Chicago audience t hat " the
balance-o f -payments drain of our military deployment in Europe
is currently about $1.5 billion a year. 11

I also pointed to the

need to reduce our military budget f rom its present level of
-1-'
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$80 billion.

Mr. Richardson has now given the Administration's arguments
f or maintaining the status quo, as f ar as our f orce levels in
Europe are concerned.

argument.

There are, o f course, two sides to every

I presented one side on the Senate Floor on December 1.

-3The Under Secretary o f State presented the other in Chicago on
January 20.

I hope that my colleagues in the Senate, those in

the other body and members of the public will examine the two
sides of the argument closely.

In this connection, and in order

to avoid repeating what I have already said on the Floor of the
Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Richardson's speech, and the f ull text of my December 1 statement, be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
I consider it necessary to make a f ew comments today, on

Mr. Richardson's speech, in order to make my position clear:
First o f all, Mr. Richardson ref erred to S. Res. 292 as an
expression of the "tendency by some to say that NATO has done its
job, so why not bring those troops home?"

May I point out that

S. Res. 292 is not an expression of a belief that "NATO has done
its job'' but, on the contrary, o f a belief that the United States
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has been doing a disproportionate share of NATO's job and that
the other 14 members of NATO are in a position to do more and
should do so.

Nor does S. Res. 292 urge that all U.S. troops be

brought home but only that there be a "substantial reduction of
U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe."
Second, Mr. Richardson states that the effectiveness of the
strategy of flexible reasons "rests perforce on the conviction in
both parts of Europe that the United States will fulfill its
determined role''.

Mr. Richardson added that "the U.S. military

presence in Europe, whether we like it or not, continues to be
taken as tangible evidence of our commitment" and that

11

any

sudden or dramatic reduction" of that presence would have
''unpleasant consequences. • . "
I would like to emphasize that S. Res. 292 neither states
nor implies that we will not fulfill our NATO obligations.

On
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the contrary, it affirms specitically that a substantial reduction
of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made "without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet
our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty."

Furthermore,

the resolution does not urge, and I have not urged, that such a
substantial reduction be either "sudden" or "dramatic".

Mr.

Richardson did not argue against a "sudden" or "dramatic" reduction
but against any reduction at all, for only a few paragraphs later
he referred to the Administration's having "pledged to maintain
our present troop strength in Europe through fiscal year 1971."
Third, Mr. Richardson stated that if "all of our forces in
Europe were brought home and stationed in this country, little
or no savings would appear in our defense budget.''

As I noted

in my December 1 statement, however, it has always been argued
that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe
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will not affect our defense budget because we cannot reduce the
number of men under arms.

But it is also argued that it is

impossible to reduce the number of men under arms, among other
reasons because of the need to maintain present force levels in
Europe.

I contended then, and I do so again now, that this end-

less circle, which will lead in the end to fiscal exhaustion,
can and must be broken.
Fourth, Mr. Richardson referred to the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe
mutual and balanced force reductions and said that the other
reason the Aaministration opposes S. Res. 292 is "the firm belief
that it would weaken our bargaining position . . . "

Mr. President, NATO has been studying mutual and balanced
force reductions for years and has still not arrived at an agreed
proposal.

Even when such a proposal is formulated, there is no

-7reason to assume that negotiations will begin for it is my understanding that there has been no indication that the Soviet Union
is interested in such negotiations.
to be the situation?

And what if that continues

Will we then be locked into maintaining our

present f orce levels in Europe in perpetuity regardless of the
costs involved or the wisdom of doing so in the light of our
national interests?
In fact, the Soviets may not be willing to reduce their
military presence in Eastern Europe no matter what the United
States does or does not do because the level of that presence may
well be dictated by political considerations within Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, if that ·':is not so, then U.S. reductions

may be the most e ff ective way to bring about Soviet reductions
because the Soviet Union could no longer justif y the presence
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o f hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on
the ground that there were hundreds of thousands of American
troops in Western Europe.
Fi f th, Mr. Richardson stated that "the bulk of any substantial
reduction in U.S. forces will have to be made up by West Germany,
the most populous and wealthy of our allies".

He

~vent

on to say

that the German people and the Soviet Union do not favor a larger
German military establishment and that such a development "would
give pause even to some of Germany's allies 11 •
I am not arguing that there should be a larger German military
establishment than has been agreed to before but only that the
West Germans meet their pre-determined NATO commitments as we
have met ours.

I might say, parenthetically, that the same

comment pertains to other NATO countries as well.

The fact is

that in terms of the percentage of armed forces to men o f military

-9age, in many NATO countries that percentage is not only below
the 8.7% f ound in the United States but also below the 4% f igure
which applies to West Germany.

And in all of the NATO countries

that have compulsory military service -- except Greece, Portugal
and Turkey -- the period of service is shorter than it is in the
United States.

In the case of Canada, Luxumbourg and the United

Kingdom, there is no compulsory military service at all.

I would

also like to point out that the United Kingdom, with a population
of 55.5 million, and Italy, with a population of 53.7 million,
are almost as populous as West Germany with a population of 58.5
million.

Furthermore, according to the Institute f or Strategic

Studies in London, Britain's 1969-70 Defense Budget of $5.4
billion was higher than Germany's 1969 Def ense Budget of $5.3
billion.

On the other hand, Italy's 1969 Defense Budget was

only $1.9 billion.
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Finally, it is all very well to talk about the "strength,
closeness, trust, realism and f lexibility" o f NATO, as Mr.
Richardson did in his concluding paragraph .

But it seems to

me that there is a contrast between these words and the f act
that the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous
industrial resources and long military experience, are unable to
organize an eff ective military coalition to de f end themselves
against 200 million Russians, who are contending

at the same

time with 700 million Chinese, but must continue a f ter 20 years
to depend on 200 million Americans f or t h eir def ense .

The

status quo has been sa f e and comf ortable f or our European allies .
But, as I observed on December 1, it has made the Europeans
less interested in their own def ense, has distorted the relationship between Europe and the United States and has resulted in a
drain on our resources which has adversely a f fected our ability
to deal with the urgent problems we f ace at home .

ENCLOSURES FOR THE RECORD

